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I solve a first-price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions
and known valuations for one object. I show that in any equilibrium, the expected
utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique. If budgets are sufficiently
low, the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium. For sufficiently high
budgets, mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise. A less restrictive budget
distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off. If the budget distribution of a
bidder is dominated by the budget distribution of his opponent in the reverse-hazard-
rate order, the weaker bidder will bid more aggressively than his stronger opponent.
In contrast to existing results for symmetric budget distributions, with asymmetric
budget distributions, a second-price auction can yield a strictly higher revenue than a
first-price auction. Under an additional assumption, I derive the unique equilibrium
utilities and bid distributions of both bidders in an all-pay auction.
Keywords Budget Constraints; First Price Auctions; Asymmetric Bidders.
JEL Classification: C72; D44; D82.
1 Introduction
Auctions are a widely used method of allocating objects, property rights and procurement
contracts. If bidders in an auction are budget constrained, this will influence their bidding
strategies, breaks the revenue equivalence of standard auctions, and lowers revenues. Budget
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constraints can arise due to credit limits and imperfect capital markets, such that bidders’
willingness to pay might exceed their ability to pay.
The existing research on standard auctions with budget constrained bidders concentrates
on identical budget distributions. Yet, there are scenarios where bidders have asymmetric
budget distributions. In a narrow market with a few major players, e.g., a telecommunica-
tions sector, bidders hold noisy information about the other bidders and their budgets. This
information might stem from previous interactions or from publicly available information,
such as annual budget reports. Moreover, the auctioneer can contribute to this asymmetry
by revealing the identities of the participants before the auction via a participation register.
In the spectrum auction of the U.S. Federal Communications Commission, 30 bidders
registered for the auction (Salant, 1997). Assessing the budget constraint of rival bidders
was a major part of the preparation before the auction (Salant, 1997). GTE was one of
the largest telecommunication firms in the U.S. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect
that the expectations of GTE about the budget of a smaller bidder, such as Poka Lambro,
differed from the expectation of the smaller bidder about the resources of GTE.
The contribution of this paper is to solve the first-price auction for bidders with asym-
metric budget distributions. I develop a solution technique that builds on an indirect utility
approach by Che and Gale (1996). I provide a closed-form expression for the expected
utilities and bid distributions of the bidders, which are unique in any equilibrium.1
In my model, two bidders are competing for one object in a first-price auction. Their
valuations are common knowledge and might differ. Each bidder has a private budget con-
straint that is drawn independently from a bidder-specific distribution. Budget constraints
are hard, that is, no bidder can bid above his budget.2 First, budget constraints directly
limit the ability to bid. Second, budgets have an indirect strategic effect: if the opponent is
budget constrained, the necessary bid to outbid him might be lower than without a budget.
Then, the constrained bidder anticipates this inference of his opponent and incorporates this
into his bidding strategy, and so forth. The extent of these strategic effects varies with the
asymmetry in budget distributions.
Che and Gale (1996) solve the first-price auction for bidders with identical budget dis-
tributions and the same common value for the object. Equilibrium utility in their model
always equals some exogenous lower bound on utility. This lower bound is the highest utility
a bidder can achieve if his opponent always bids his entire budget and, thus, minimizes the
1I do not restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, nor to monotonic bidding strategies.
2See, e.g., Zheng (2001) for a model with soft budget constraints where bidders can borrow.
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probability of his opponent winning at any bid. They restrict attention to monotonic bidding
strategies and symmetric equilibria, hence, mass points cannot arise in their setup.
In my model, I allow for asymmetric budget distributions and different values. I do
not restrict attention to symmetric or monotonic equilibria. I determine the relationship
between a lower bound utility and the actual equilibrium utility. This relationship is not an
equality as in the symmetric setup in Che and Gale (1996). My approach rules out candidate
equilibria utilities, until exactly one candidate utility is left.
Mass points arise in equilibrium. Bidders who would like to deviate and bid at the mass
point or slightly above to increase their winning probability cannot afford such deviations
due to their budget constraints. I show that each bidder places at most one mass point.
If the reverse hazard rate of both bidders is above a threshold, bidders bid the entire
budget in any equilibrium. Then, equilibrium utility equals the lower bound utility, and
bidding the entire budget on this interval constitutes a fix point.
If one reverse hazard rate drops below the threshold, equilibrium utilities either jump
up due to a mass point of the opponent, or are constant on some indifference regions. In
indifference regions, the opponent uses a bid distributions that makes a bidder indifferent
between any bid in this interval. Equilibrium utilities can strictly exceed their lower bound.
I show that asymmetric budget distributions break the revenue dominance of the first-
price auction over the second-price auction. For the special case of reverse hazard rate
dominance in budget distributions, a weak bidder bids more aggressively than a strong
bidder. This is in line with the literature on asymmetrically distributed valuations (Maskin
and Riley, 2000), where the weaker bidder (with regards to the valuation distribution) bids
more aggressively. Similarly, if budget distributions are identical, but one bidder values the
object more, he bids more aggressively.
I find the necessary and sufficient conditions for a bidder to derive a higher utility than
his opponent at every budget realization. I show that a first-price auction might allocate the
object inefficiently, even if the bidder with the highest value for the object has also a higher
budget realization than his opponent. Finally, I apply my technique to derive a closed-form
equilibrium for an all-pay auction.
Related Literature: Che and Gale (1996, 1998, 2000) are amongst the first to analyze
auctions with budget constrained bidders. In their seminal contributions, they derive the
equilibrium for auctions with budget constraints and show that revenue equivalence no longer
holds when bidders are symmetrically budget constrained. Research on budget constraints
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in standard 1-object auctions (see, e.g., Che and Gale, 1996, 1998; Kotowski, 2018; Kotowski
and Li, 2014) considers symmetric budget distributions. However, literature on asymmetri-
cally budget constrained bidders is scarce. Malakhov and Vohra (2008) derived the optimal
auction with two bidders, where only one bidder is constrained and his identity is common
knowledge. Some literature on multiple object auctions (see, e.g., Benoît and Krishna, 2001;
Dobzinski et al., 2012) considers asymmetric budgets, however, it relies upon common knowl-
edge of budget realizations. In this work, I merge the assumption of asymmetric budgets
into a framework that allows for private budget realization.
The previous work that is closest to my framework is Che and Gale (1996). They con-
sidered many bidders with an identical commonly known valuation for the object. Budget
realizations of the bidders in Che and Gale (1996) are private and independent draws from
the same distribution. My model generalizes their model in two directions: first, in my
model, budgets are drawn from asymmetric distributions. Second, the valuations for the
object may differ between bidders. This allows me to capture the effect of valuation het-
erogeneity on the bidding strategies. In contrast to Che and Gale (1996), I do not restrict
attention to symmetric and monotonic equilibria, but I impose log-concavity on the bud-
get distribution and consider two bidders. I show in Section 4.1 that there exist no other
asymmetric equilibrium utilities and bid distributions, aside from the symmetric equilibrium
utility that Che and Gale (1996) found.
The analysis of this paper relates to asymmetric auctions, in which the valuations of
bidders are drawn from non-identical distributions, and bidders do not have budget con-
straints (see the seminal contribution of Maskin and Riley, 2000). Analytical solutions exist
for only a few particular distributions, e.g., Maskin and Riley (2000) and Kaplan and Zamir
(2012) for uniform distributions, and Plum (1992) and Cheng (2006) for power distributions.
Asymmetric auctions have been approached by perturbation analysis (see, e.g., Fibich and
Gavious, 2003; Fibich et al., 2004; Lebrun, 2009). Nevertheless, even for two bidders with
asymmetrically drawn valuations from the same support, no general closed-form solution is
known. The first-price and second-price auctions no longer yield the same revenue under
asymmetric value distributions, with the revenue ranking depending on the asymmetry of the
value distributions (Maskin and Riley, 2000; Cantillon, 2008; Gavious and Minchuk, 2014).
If bidders are asymmetric not in valuations but in budgets, my results apply. In contrast
to the literature on asymmetry in valuations, a closed-form solution exists for asymmetric
budget distributions. Revenue can therefore be easily computed. A unique equilibrium util-
ity and bid distribution exist under mild regularity conditions. This holds for all log-concave
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budget distribution functions with the same support, without assuming any stochastic dom-
inance order.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. The characterization
of the equilibrium in a first-price auction follows in Section 3, using a lower bound on the
utility (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2, I determine a unique equilibrium utility by deriving four
core lemmas. Section 3.3 establishes the uniqueness of the bid distributions, and Section 3.4
the existence of an equilibrium. Section 4 discusses the implications for symmetric bidders,
bidding aggression, welfare, and efficiency. In Section 5, I extend my results to compare
the revenue in a first-price and a second-price auction, analyze information disclosure about
budget types, and solve an all-pay auction. I conclude in Section 6. All omitted proofs are
in the Appendix.
2 Model
An auctioneer (she) sells one object with zero value for her in a first-price auction (FPA). She
employs an equal tie-breaking rule and no reserve price. There are 2 risk-neutral bidders,
indexed by i ∈ {1, 2}. Bidder i has a valuation vi for the object. The valuation tuple {v1, v2}
is common knowledge for the bidders.
Each bidder (he) has a private budget wi, which is drawn independently from a dis-
tribution with a continuous and differentiable cumulative distribution function Fi(w) and
probability density function fi(w). Both distribution functions {Fi(w)}i=1,2 have common
support [w,w], are atom-less, are common knowledge, and have full support. Both bidders
are budget constrained with non-zero probability, min{v1, v2} > w.3
Assumption 1. F1(w) and F2(w) satisfy log-concavity on (w,w).4
Due to Assumption 1, the reverse hazard rates (RHRs) fi(w)
Fi(w) are decreasing in w.
The bidding strategy of bidder i maps his budget realization w into a distribution over
feasible bids [0, w]. Let bi be a random variable denoting the placed bid of bidder i. Let
bi(w) be a bid in the bidding support of bidder i with budget w. Bidders have hard5
budget constraints: they cannot bid above their budget. A feasible bidding strategy satisfies
bi(w) ≤ w for all bids of any budget type w. If a bidder i wins the object by placing a
feasible bid bi, his utility is vi − bi.
3If one bidder is unconstrained, vi ≤ w, the game effectively reduces to Bertrand competition.
4See Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) for many commonly used distributions that satisfy log-concavity.
5An equivalent formulation for my analysis is to impose fines on overbidding and to forbid renegotiation.
E.g., see Footnote 2 in Che and Gale (1996).
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Example 1. Bidder 1 and 2 have the same valuation v := v1 = v2 for the object. Their
budget distributions are F1(w) = w2 and F2(w) = w for w ∈ [0, 1].
In the above example, bidder 1 is stronger than bidder 2 in the sense of first oder stochastic
dominance (FOSD). I use this example in the following to depict my solution technique.6
3 Equilibrium of the First Price Auction
Let Gi(x) = Pr(bi ≤ x) be the cumulative distribution function of bidder i’s bid, that is,
the probability of bidder i bidding below or equal to x. A feasibility constraint holds as a
necessity of the hard budget constraints:
Gi(x) ≥ Fi(x) ∀x ∈ [0, w]. (1)
Every bidder with a budget below x bids weakly below x. Moreover, a bidder with a
budget strictly above x might shade his bid down below x, yielding the weak inequality in
the feasibility constraint in Equation 1. If bidders always bid their entire budget for any
budget realization, the above feasibility constraint holds with equality at every x.
The expected utility of bidder i with a budget w, given bidder j’s bid distribution, is
Ui(w) = max0≤bi≤w
{(vi − bi)[Pr(bj < bi)] + 12(vi − bi) Pr(bj = bi)}. (2)
The second summand accounts for the equal tie-breaking rule. In my model, equilibrium
strategies may contain mass points and the probability of a tie is therefore non-negligible.
Due to the individual (potentially slack) budget constraints, and the discontinuities in the
objective function in Equation 2 induced by atoms in the bid distributions, a classic differ-
entiation approach with invertible bidding functions is not possible. I solve this problem via
an indirect utility approach, using a lower bound on the equilibrium utility.
In the following, I derive a uniqueness result for the equilibrium utilities U1 and U2 and
the bid distributions G1 and G2. An existence result follows in Section 4, where I show that
there always exist an equilibrium in weakly monotonic pure strategies.
6Note that I do not impose any stochastic order between F1(w) and F2(w) in the general model.
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3.1 Lower Bound
Consider the lowest feasible bound on the equilibrium utility of bidder i with budget w,
called the lower bound utility U i(w). This lower bound utility is achieved if the opponent j
always plays the following naive strategy: bidding his entire budget and, hence, minimizing
the winning probability of bidder i at any bid. Under this naive strategy of bidder j, bidder
i’s bid bi wins with a probability Gj(bi) = Fj(bi). Any bid placed by i wins with a weakly
lower probability under the naive strategy than under any other feasible strategy for j.
Next, I characterize the properties of the lower bound U i(w) = maxbi≤w(vi − bi)Fj(bi).
Subsequently, I derive the equilibrium utility Ui(w) from the lower bound utility U i(w).
Lemma 1. Let bidder j bid his entire budget, and Fj be log-concave. Then, the unique best
response bid for bidder i with budget w is
arg max
bi≤w
(vi − bi)Fj(bi) =
w if w < mi,mi if w ≥ mi. (3)
with some unique mi ∈ (w,w]. The lower bound U i(w) for i ∈ {1, 2} is continuous, strictly
increasing for w < mi and constant for w ∈ [mi, w].
Bidmi is the unconstrained best response of bidder i to a naive opponent biddingGj = Fj.
Either bidder i can afford to bid mi (w ≥ mi), or he bids his entire budget to bid as close as
possible to mi (bi(w) = w if w < mi). The resulting lower bound utility is
U i(w) = max
bi≤w
(vi − bi)Fj(bi) =
(vi − w)Fj(w) if w < mi,(vi −mi)Fj(mi) if w ≥ mi, (4)
The marginal utility of an increase in bid bi is non-negative if the gain in the probability




vi − bi , (5)
where the RHR fj(b)
Fj(b) is monotonically decreasing by log-concavity, and the right hand side is
strictly increasing in bi. Inequality 5 holds with strict inequality for bi < mi, with equality for
bi = mi, and does not hold for bi > mi. Any bid above mi yields a strictly lower payoff than
bidding mi for bidder i. The unconstrained best response mi to a naive strategy opponent
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is increasing in (and always below) vi. If the value of the object is sufficiently high, bidding
the entire budget may be the best response for every budget realization.
In what follows, I assume without loss of generality that m1 ≤ m2.7 Both lower bounds
are strictly increasing for w < m1. Figure 1 shows the lower bound utilities for Example 1
with v = 1. U1(w) is strictly increasing for w < m1 = 12 , and constant for higher budget
realizations. U2(w) is strictly increasing for w < m2 = 23 .
Figure 1: Lower bound utilities for Example 1 with v = 1.
The lower bound utility U i(w) is a generalization of the lower bound expression in Che
and Gale (1996). In contrast to their model, I allow for asymmetric budget distributions
and different valuations, and impose the assumption of log-concavity on F1 and F2. They
show that in the class of symmetric and monotonic equilibria, the lower bound binds, i.e.,
Ui(w) = U i(w) for all w ∈ [w,w].8 For asymmetric bidders and valuations, I show that the
lower bound does not generically bind and mass points may arise in equilibrium.
I differentiate between two cases:9
(C1) U1(m1)− U2(m2) ≥ v1 − v2.
(C2) U1(m1)− U2(m2) < v1 − v2.
Note the parallel to Bertrand competition with unconstrained bidders. If both bidders
have unlimited budget and vi > vj, bidder i wins by bidding vj and his opponent j randomizes
in some non-empty interval below vj in the equilibrium in undominated strategies (Blume,
7If m1 = m2, I label bidders such that U1(m1)− U2(m2) ≥ v1 − v2. This is without loss and guarantees
that if there is exactly one mass point in equilibrium, it will be placed by bidder 1.
8In Section 4.1, I apply my findings to the setting of Che and Gale (1996) to find all (possibly asymmetric
and non-monotonic) equilibrium utilities and bid distributions.
9This case distinction determines how many mass points arise in equilibrium.
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2003).10 The payoff of bidder i is (vi − vj), and bidder j has zero payoff. The difference in
payoffs is the right-hand side of (C1) and (C2). U i(mi) is the utility of an unconstrained
bidder i (being able to afford the best response bidmi) from bidding against a naive opponent
who bids his entire budget. The left-hand side of (C1) and (C2) is the difference in utilities
from bidding against a naive constrained opponent.
The two cases compare the net gain in utility: who gains more from bidding against a
naive constrained opponent instead of an unconstrained opponent? This gain is higher for
bidder 1 in (C1) and strictly higher for bidder 2 in (C2).
3.2 Equilibrium Utility
In the following, I derive four properties that any equilibrium satisfies. Together, these
properties rule out all but a single candidate for the shape of the equilibrium utility.
Consider any given candidate equilibrium utility Ui. Bidding strategies may sometimes
be inferred from the properties of Ui, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 2. Let Ui(w) be strictly increasing on some open interval (w′, w′′). Then, bidder i
with any budget realization w ∈ (w′, w′′) always bids his entire budget, and Gi(w) = Fi(w).
This has been noted by Che and Gale (1996).11 For completeness, I include the proof
in the appendix. The same (feasible) bid bi always yields the same utility to bidder i,
irrespective of his budget realization: (vi − bi) Pr(bj < bi) + 12(vi − bi) Pr(bj = bi). This is
because the valuation vi and winning probability of bidder i do not depend on his budget.
If bidder i achieves a strictly higher utility with a higher budget than a lower budget, then
those bids placed with the higher budget must be unaffordable for him with a lower budget.
Hence, if Ui is strictly increasing in bidder i’s budget, bidder i bids his their entire budget:
this is the only bid which cannot be mimicked by any lower budget type.
The following lemma shows that whenever the utility is strictly increasing, the lower
bound utility binds.
Lemma 3. Let Ui(w) be strictly increasing for w ∈ (w′, w′′). Then, for all w ∈ (w′, w′′) the
lower bound binds: Ui(w) = U i(w).
If the expected utility of bidder i in equilibrium is strictly increasing, by Lemma 2, bidder
i exhausts his budget over this interval. Thus, bidder j is essentially facing a naive opponent
10If v1 = v2, both unconstrained bidders have zero payoff and the interpretation still applies.
11See Footnote 7 in the proof of Lemma 1 in Che and Gale (1996).
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i within this interval who always bids his entire budget. Either the opponent j would not
want to bid within this interval at all (e.g., if the interval is above mj), or he would also
want to exhaust his entire budget. The former leads to a contradiction, as bidder i would
never want to be the only one bidding in an open interval. The latter leads to a scenario
in which both bidders bid their entire budget, and by definition receive nothing more than
their lower bound utility.
Put differently, for Ui to rise strictly above the lower bound, the bid distribution of
the opponent must contain mass points. A smooth increase of Ui over an open interval is
impossible according to Lemma 3, and the utility in Equation 2 is continuous, unless the
opponent places mass points.
The next result shows that as long as both lower bound utilities are strictly increasing,
bidding the entire budget is the unique best response correspondence.
Lemma 4. In any equilibrium, bidders with a budget w ∈ (w,m1) bid their entire budget.
For all w ∈ [w,m1), the lower bound binds: Ui(w) = U i(w).
Assume the opponent bids his entire budget on (w,m1). Any bid below one’s budget
loses so much probability in terms of winning that it does not justify the gain from the lower
payment in case of a win. This guarantees that both bidders bidding their entire budget on
this interval are mutually best responses. Lemma 4 establishes that this is the unique best
response correspondence in any equilibrium.12
The following properties further narrow down the set of candidate equilibria.
Lemma 5. For i 6= j, the following holds in any equilibrium:
1. Ui has at most one discontinuity. If it arises, it occurs at mj and Uj(mj) = U j(mj).
2. U1 is constant on (m1,m2) and (m2, w]; U2 is constant on (m1, w].
For a sketch of the argument, let bidder i have a strictly increasing utility Ui on some
interval above m1. Then, by Lemma 4, the lower bound binds, Ui = U i. As Ui is constant
above mi, this rules out any strict increase in U1 above m1 for bidder 1, and in U2 above
m2 for bidder 2. In the remaining case, bidder 2 has a strictly increasing utility U2 on some
interval within (m1,m2). Then, bidder 2 bids his entire budget and F2 = G2 on this interval
by Lemma 2. Bidder 1 then essentially faces a naive opponent in this interval. But bidder
12Lemma 4 does not specify the bid of the lowest budget type w, while it determines his utility Ui(w) = 0.
As a budget w is a zero-probability event, bi(w) has no impact on Gi.
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1 would not want to bid above m1 if his winning probability is the same as against a naive
opponent; he could strictly do better by bidding m1. Thus, U2 cannot be strictly increasing.
I show that discontinuities can only be due to mass points of the opponent. Mass points
can occur only at m1 (in bidder 1’s strategy) and m2 (in bidder 2’s strategy). For a sketch
of the argument, consider bidder 1 placing a mass point at some bid x > m1. For his
opponent 2, a bid at the mass point yields lower utility than bidding infinitesimally above
the mass point (due to a discrete jump in winning probability). However, this implies that
bidder 2 with a budget above the mass point would never bid at or below the mass point.
Furthermore, bidder 2 with a lower budget prefers to bid at the mass point, but cannot
afford it. Hence, G2(x) = F2(x). The mass point placing bidder 1 essentially faces a naive
opponent 2 at the mass point, and could do strictly better by bidding m1 instead of x.
The next result determines a unique equilibrium utility as a function of the lower bound,
using Lemma 2, 3, 4 and 5 to derive the complete characterization.
Theorem 1. Let (C1) hold. In any equilibrium, utilities are
U1(w) = U1(w) for all w, (6)
U2(w) =

U2(w) if w < m1,
1
2 (U2(m1) + U1(m1)− (v1 − v2)) if w = m1,
U1(m1)− (v1 − v2) otherwise.
(7)
Let (C2) hold. In any equilibrium, utilities are
U1(w) =

U1(w) if w < m2,
1
2 (U1(m2) + U2(m2) + (v1 − v2)) if w = m2,




U2(w) if w < m1,
1
2 (U2(m1) + U2(m2)) if w = m1,
U2(m2) otherwise.
(9)
A unique equilibrium utility can be recovered by computing the lower bound utilities U1
and U2, the best response bids to a naive opponent m1 and m2, and the difference v1 − v2.
The utility levels of the wealthiest bidders with budget w are exactly v1 − v2 apart, as
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they both have the same supremum bid that wins with a probability of one.13 In order
to achieve this distance (v1 − v2) in the final utility levels, Lemma 5 allows the following
variants: equilibrium utility Ui can jump only at mj, but not increase continuously; a jump
in Ui at mj determines the utility of bidder j 6= i to U j(mj) for an interval of higher budget
levels. The above theorem shows that there is one unique way to allocate discontinuities
such that the required utility difference U1(w) − U2(w) = v1 − v2 is satisfied. This involves
exactly one discontinuity in bidder 2’s utility in Case (C1), and two discontinuities in both
bidders’ utilities in Case (C2).
Figure 2: Case (C1) with v1 = 2, v2 = 3,
and m1 = m2 = w.
Figure 3: Case (C1) with v1 = 1, v2 =
0.95, and U1 > U2.
Figure 2 illustrates the case m1 = m2 = w for the budget distributions in Example 1,
with v1 = 2 and v2 = 3. The object is valuable enough and both bidders are likely to
have a sufficiently high budget (i.e., Inequality 5 holds at every budget level) such that both
lower bounds are strictly increasing within the entire budget domain. Case (C1) applies, as
U i(mi) = U i(w) = vi − 1. The grey dashed lines are the lower bound utilities; they coincide
with the equilibrium utility of bidder 1 (bidder 2), depicted by the blue (green) solid line.
For all w < 1 = w, by Lemma 4, it holds that Ui = U i. Bidder i with a budget w = 1 bids
his entire budget14 and derives a payoff Ui(1) = U i(1) = vi − 1.
Figure 3 illustrates Case (C1) for Example 1 with v1 = 1 and v2 = 0.95. A quick
calculation reveals m1 = 0.5 and m2 = 0.63. The lower bound utilities of the bidders are
depicted by the dashed lines, the equilibrium utilities by the solid lines. The lower bounds
and the equilibrium utilities coincide for w < m1. By Lemma 5, bidder 2’s utility is constant
on (m1, w] and can only have a jump discontinuity at m1. It holds that U1(m1)−U2(m2) ≥
13See Lemma A.1 in the Appendix for further details.
14Any lower bid yields a strictly lower payoff as it corresponds to the payoff of a x-budget type.
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v1 − v2 = 0.05 = U1(1) − U2(1). That is, for high enough budgets, the distance between
the dashed gray lines is larger than the necessary distance between the solid green and blue
lines in equilibrium. Thus, at least one utility has to lie strictly above the lower bound to
achieve the necessary distance. Bidder 2’s utility jumps at m1 by such a magnitude to its
final level such that the utility difference between the equilibrium amounts to v1−v2 = 0.05.
This rules out a discontinuity in bidder 1’s utility. Otherwise, by Lemma 5, it would hold
that U2(w ≥ m2) = U2(m2). Then, the distance to the highest utility of bidder 1 (which is
bounded below by U1) is strictly larger than the required v1 − v2.
Figure 4 shows another example for Case (C1) with U1 < U2. Bidder 1 achieves exactly
his lower bound utility for every budget level and bidder 2’s utility U2 jumps at m1 above
the lower bound U2 to achieve the required distance (v1 − v2).
If m1 = m2 and U1(m1)− U2(m2) = v1 − v2, then Case (C1) applies. The lower bounds
bind for every budget, and there are no discontinuities in the utilities: any mass point would
distort the utility difference of the bidders away from the correct distance v1 − v2.15
Figure 4: Case (C1) with U1 < U2. Figure 5: Case (C2) for U1 > U2.
The utilities in Case (C2) in Theorem 1 are outlined in Figure 5. In this case, the
difference between the equilibrium utilities (v1 − v2) is larger than U1(m1) − U2(m2). This
cannot be achieved by a mass point of bidder 1 alone, as this would pin down the utility of
bidder 1 to U1(w ≥ m1) = U1(m1) by Lemma 5. Bidder 2 has to place a mass point at bid
m2 to increase the difference in the equilibrium utilities to the required level.
In summary, if m1 = w, Lemma 4 characterizes effectively the entire equilibrium utility
and no mass points arise. If m1 < w and Case (C1) holds, then bidder 1 places a mass
point of such magnitude to elevate bidder 2’s utility to its final level (v1 − v2 below his own
utility). In Case (C2), bidders 1 and 2 place mass points at distinct bids to achieve the
15This is the case in the symmetric setup with v1 = v2 and F1 = F2 in Che and Gale (1996).
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required distance v1 − v2.
3.3 Equilibrium Bid Distributions
The next result shows the unique bid distributions and supremum bids in any equilibrium.
Theorem 2. In any equilibrium, the supremum bid of both bidders is
b =
v1 − (v1 −m1)F2(m1) if (C1),v2 − (v2 −m2)F1(m2) if (C2), (10)
and the cumulative bid distributions satisfy
G1(b) =
F1(b) if b < m1,v2−b
v2−b if b ∈ [m1, b],
G2(b) =

F2(b) if b < m1,
(v1−m1)F2(m1)
v1−b if b ∈ [m1,m2),
v1−b
v1−b if b ∈ [m2, b].
(11)
Bid distributions are unique in equilibrium, should it exist. They are invariant to the
degree of asymmetry, as long as both lower bound utilities are strictly increasing. F1(w)
and F2(w) can be identical, stochastically ordered (e.g., FOSD); bidding the entire budget
is always the unique equilibrium candidate for budgets below m1. Above m1, bidders place
bids on a non-empty interval to make their opponent indifferent. For example, in Case (C1),




in such a way that any bid in this interval
yields the same expected payoff to the opponent.
The equilibrium bid distributions might require mass points. This is summarized in the
following result which immediately follows from the bid distributions in Theorem 2.
Corollary 1. Each bidder has at most one mass point. Bidder 1 has a mass point at m1 if
and only if m1 < m2. Bidder 2 has a mass point at m2 if and only if (C2) holds.
3.4 Equilibrium Existence
The following result establishes existence of an equilibrium. I derive pure strategy weakly
monotonic bidding functions that are feasible and optimal for the bidders.
Theorem 3. A pure strategy weakly monotonic equilibrium exists in the FPA.
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The proof is by construction. If (C1) holds, the following weakly monotonic bidding
functions constitute an equilibrium. (The bidding functions for (C2) are in the appendix.)
b1(w) =

w if w ∈ [w,m1),
m1 if w ∈ [m1, F−11 ( v2−bv2−m1 )],
v2 − v2−bF1(w) otherwise.
(12)
b2(w) =
w if w ∈ [w,m1),v1 − v1−bF2(w) otherwise. (13)
It is straightforward to show that these bidding functions b1 and b2 are feasible (i.e.,
bi(w) ≤ w) and aggregate into the bid distributions G1 and G2 in Theorem 2. They are also
optimal for the bidders. Bidder i with a budget in [w,m1) would prefer to bid more than
his budget, but cannot afford it; bidding below his budget yields a strictly lower payoff. On
(m1, b], both bidders are bidding in such a way as to make their opponent indifferent between
any bid in this interval. A mass point of bidder 1 at m1 can be sustained in equilibrium.
Bidder 2, who bids at or slightly below the mass point m1 of his opponent, would want to
increase his bid and get a jump in winning probability. However, bidder 2 cannot afford this
upward deviation as he is already bidding his entire budget at and below the mass point.
Numerical Example. Consider the budget distributions in Example 1 and let v = 1.
Then, m1 = 12 , m2 =
2
3 and (C1) applies. The lower bound utilities are depicted in Figure 1.
The following pure strategy bidding functions constitute a weakly monotonic equilibrium:
b1(w) =

w if w < 12 ,
1
2 if w ∈ [12 , 1√2 ],
1− 14w2 otherwise,
and b2(w) =




Figure 6 illustrates these two bidding functions. The blue dashed (green solid) line is the
bidding function of the strong bidder 1 (weak bidder 2). Bidders place their entire budget
if w < 12 . Bidder 1 places a mass point on m1 =
1
2 . The highest bid b =
3
4 wins with a
probability of one and yields the same payoff v − b = 14 to both bidders.
Figure 7 shows the corresponding equilibrium utility of bidder 1 (blue line) and bidder 2
(green line). Utility is strictly increasing below m1 = 12 . Bidder 1’s mass point at m1 raises
bidder 2’s utility to the same level as his own for budgets above 12 . Bidder 2, with a budget
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at the mass point or slightly below, cannot deviate upwards as his budget constraint binds.
It is important to note that the constancy in equilibrium utility does not correspond to
constancy in bids. The bidding function of bidder 2 makes bidder 1 indifferent between all
bids in [12 ,
3
4 ], including his mass point m1. Similarly, bidder 2 is indifferent between any bid
between (12 ,
3
4 ] due to bidder 1’s bid distribution.
Figure 6: Bidding functions for v = 1. Figure 7: Equilibrium utilities for v = 1.
4 Discussion of the Results
4.1 Symmetric Bidders
In this section, I derive the equilibria for symmetric bidders. Let F (w) := F1(w) = F2(w)
log-concave and v := v1 = v2. Both bidders have the same lower bound utility U(w) :=
U1(w) = U2(w) and m := m1 = m2, and (C1) therefore holds. If the opponent always bids
his entire budget, both bidders prefer to bid m (or their full budget if they cannot afford m).
Che and Gale (1996) solve for a symmetric and monotonic equilibrium.16 They show
that the lower bound always binds, Ui(w) = U(w) for all w. I show that in any (possibly
asymmetric and non-monotonic) equilibrium the following holds:
Corollary 2. Let v := v1 = v2 and F (w) := F1(w) = F2(w) satisfy Assumption 1. Any
equilibrium has the following properties:
1. lower bounds utilities bind, i.e., for all w, Ui(w) = U(w),
16Che and Gale (1998) allow for n ≥ 2 bidders and do not impose log-concavity on the distribution F (w).
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2. bid distributions are Gi(b) =
F (b) if b < m,(v−m)F (m)
v−b if b ∈ [m, v − (v −m)F (m)].
This is a direct application of Theorems 1 and 2 for Case (C1), the proof is therefore
omitted. By Corollary 1, no bidder can place a mass point. Figure 8 shows an example with
v = 1 and F (w) = w for w ∈ [0, 1]. The equilibrium utility coincides for both bidders (blue
line) and equals the lower bound utility, which is strictly increasing below m = 0.5.
Figure 8: Equilibrium utilities with v = 1 and F (w) = w.
Che and Gale (1998) derive a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies (see Lemma 1 in
Che and Gale (1998)). For the case of two bidders with log-concave budget distributions,
these strategies correspond with the bid functions in Equations 12 and 13 in this paper and
aggregate into the bid distributions in Statement 2 of Corollary 2.
What other equilibria can exist within this framework? First, consider m = w. Then, by
Lemma 4, bidders with w ∈ (w,w) bid their entire budget in any equilibrium. The bidder
with the highest budget w bids his entire budget as any lower bid yields a strictly lower
payoff. The bidder with the lowest budget w bids anything weakly lower than his budget.
Hence, if m = w there exists a unique17 equilibrium where bidders exhaust their budgets.18
Second, letm < w. For w < m, Lemma 4 also pins down the behavior in any equilibrium,
bi(w) = w. For w ≥ m, there exists a multiplicity of other (asymmetric) bidding functions
in the indifference regions above m, aside from the symmetric pure strategy monotonic
equilibrium in Equations 12 and 13. These equilibrium bidding functions aggregate into the
17It is unique up to the behavior of the lowest budget bidder, who will lose for any feasible bid.
18This is also the equilibrium that Che and Gale (1998) describe in their Lemma 1.
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same bid distributions Gi(b) in Statement 2 in Corollary 2. Bidders with a budget above m
can play a variety of mixed strategy combinations, as they are indifferent between any bid
in the bidding support [m, b]. A bidder cares only about the aggregated bid distribution of
his opponent, not about which specific bidding function it stems from.19
Overall, lower bounds bind Ui(w) = U(w) and the bid distributions Gi(b) are unique in
any equilibrium in this symmetric framework. If m < w, there might also exist a variety of
asymmetric and mixed strategy bidding functions apart from the symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium that Che and Gale (1998) found.
4.2 Bidding Aggression
The monotonic pure strategy bidding functions in Section 3.4 allow a direct comparison in
bidding behavior. For example, which bidder bids more aggressively if both have the same
budget? When comparing bidding aggression in my model, there are two channels of interest.
First, how does bidding aggression depend on the budget distribution? Second, how does
bidding aggression depend on the valuation for the object?
As Lemma 4 shows, bidders with budget realization in [w,m1) always bid their entire
budget and are equally aggressive, irrespectively of any order statistic assumption on their
budget distributions. If m1 = w, under any order statistic, both bidders bid equally aggres-
sive on the entire budget support in my framework.






In the next result, I assume that both bidders have the same valuation v for the object,
and one bidder dominates his opponent in terms of RHR in the budget distribution. This
allows me to elicit the differences in bidding aggression that are only due to differences in
the budget distributions and not to heterogeneous valuations.
19For example, with v = 1 and F (w) = w, one bidder could bid according to the following non-monotonic
feasible bidding function, which aggregates into the required Gi:
bi(w) =
{




16w2 + 8w − 15− 4w + 7) if w ∈ ( 34 , 1].
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Proposition 1. Let v := v1 = v2 and Fi ≥RHR Fj. Then, the dominant bidder bids less
aggressively, bi(w) ≤ bj(w).
Proof. As bidder i RHR-dominates bidder j, it holds that i = 1 because m1 ≤ m2. This is
because the RHR-condition of the dominant bidder i is stricter than the RHR-condition of
the dominated bidder. As RHR-dominance implies FOSD, it holds that U1(m1) ≥ U2(m2)
and Case (C1). The highest bid is b = v− (v−m1)F2(m1) and it can be easily checked that
the bidding strategies in Equations 12 and 13 imply b1(w) ≤ b2(w) for all w ∈ [w,w].
Maskin and Riley (2000) target a related question for asymmetrically distributed val-
uations and bidders with unconstrained liquidity. They consider a variant of the RHR-
dominance on valuation distributions and show that if both bidders have the same valuation,
the RHR-dominated bidder bids more aggressively. This is in line with the findings of this
paper: the weaker bidder in the sense of RHR on budgets bids more aggressively.
Proposition 1 compared bidding behavior for bidders with equal valuations and distinct
bid distributions. Next, I compare bidders with identical budget distributions F (w) :=
F1(w) = F2(w), but different valuations v1 6= v2.
Let vi > vj. Then, the RHR-condition is satisfied for bidder i whenever the RHR-
condition is satisfied for bidder j, because 1
vi−w <
1
vj−w for all w ∈ (w,min{vj, w}). Therefore,
it holds that j = 1 and v2 > v1. An example is depicted in Figure 4. Due to the higher
valuation, the lower bound of bidder 2 is always above the lower bound of bidder 1.
Proposition 2. Let vi > vj and Fi(w) = Fj(w). Then, bi(w) ≥ bj(w) for all w ∈ [w,w].
Proof. Let v2 > v1 and F (w) := F1(w) = F2(w). It holds that U1(m1) = U1(m2) ≥
(v1 −m2)F (m2), and hence
U2(m2)− U1(m1) = U2(m2)− U1(m2)
≤ (v2 −m2)F (m2)− (v1 −m2)F (m2)
= (v2 − v1)F (m2) ≤ v2 − v1.
Thus, Case (C1) applies. Using the pure monotonic bidding strategies in Equations 12





]. For higher w,
by assumption v1 < v2, and it holds that b1(w) = v2 − v2−bF (w) ≤ v1 − v1−bF (w) = b2(w).
As before, bidders exhaust their entire budget below m1. For any higher budget, the
bidder who values the object more bids more aggressively.
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4.3 Bidder Welfare
When does a bidder have a higher utility level than his opponent at any budget realization?
The following result provides necessary and sufficient conditions.
Proposition 3. The following statements are equivalent:
1. For all w, Ui(w) ≥ Uj(w).
2. For all w, U i(w) ≥ U j(w) and vi ≥ vj.
It is instructive to consider when the primitives of the model {v1, v2, F1, F2} translate
into a higher lower bound utility U i at every budget level. If v1 = v2, FOSD is a sufficient,
but not a necessary condition for U i ≥ U j. Let m1 < w. Below m1, the object is sufficiently
valuable and the opponent has a sufficiently high RHR to justify always exhausting their
budget. In this case, the condition U i(w) ≥ U j(w) is equivalent to Fi(w) ≤ Fj(w). For
higher budget realizations than m1, the condition U i(w) ≥ U j(w) is less strict than FOSD.
This stresses that the precise shape of the budget distribution matters only for sufficiently
low budget realizations for which Inequality 5 holds.
Below are the two special cases from Section 4.2 that are sufficient for one bidder to
derive a higher utility than his opponent at every budget realization.
Observation 1. Let vi = vj, and Fi ≥RHR Fj. Then, i = 1, (C1) holds, and U1(w) ≥ U2(w)
for all w.
Let vi > vj, and Fi = Fj. Then, i = 2, (C2) holds, and U2(w) ≥ U1(w) for all w.
If a bidder has either a higher valuation or a higher budget distribution (in the sense of
the RHR-dominance) than his opponent, he enjoys a higher lower bound utility: at every
budget level, he is either more likely to win (RHR-dominance) or values the event of winning
more (higher valuation) when bidding against a naive opponent.
A related question is how a change in the budget distribution impacts upon the utility
of a bidder. Is a bidder better off with a higher (in terms of RHRs) budget distribution F ′k
instead of Fk?20 It turns out that the opposite is the case: both bidders are harmed by a
stronger budget distribution.
As in Equation 2, let Ui(w) be the equilibrium utility of bidder i with Fk, and U ′i(w) with
F ′k. Let b be the supremum bid with distribution Fk, and b
′ with distribution F ′k.
20My findings rely on both bidders knowing the budget distribution Fk or F ′k of bidder k.
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Proposition 4. Let F ′k ≥RHR Fk for some k ∈ {1, 2} and fix {v1, v2, Fj 6=k}. Then, b′ ≥ b.
For both i ∈ {1, 2} it holds that G′i is FOSD over Gi and for every w, U ′i(w) ≤ Ui(w). Both
bidders can be strictly worse off under F ′k than under Fk.
If, ceteris paribus, a bidder enjoys a stronger budget distribution, the bidding interval is
stretched toward a higher supremum bid. The winning probability of any bid is lower for
both bidders, and both bidders are worse off. The inequalities can be strict for both bidders,
such that both bidders are strictly harmed by an increase in one’s budget distribution at
every budget level.21 Overall, a more slack budget constraint in the sense of RHR-dominance
might be strictly worse for a bidder: although the budget distribution places more mass on
higher budget realizations (and, thus, possibly higher surplus), this effect might not fully
compensate his higher bids and his lower winning probability at every budget level.
The private binding budget constraints shield bidders from overbidding each other as in
Bertrand competition, until at least one surplus is zero (Blume, 2003). A less restrictive
budget distribution strengthens a bidder’s competitive position in comparison to his oppo-
nent, who reacts by bidding higher. A less restrictive budget distribution also brings a bidder
closer to the unrestricted Bertrand game with zero payoff, as it relaxes his ability to pay up
to his valuation.
4.4 Efficiency
If v1 6= v2, is the winner of the FPA the bidder with the highest value for the object? It is
straightforward to see that this is not the case: a bidder with the lowest budget w always
loses irrespective of his valuation.
A weaker requirement on efficiency is the following: does a bidder i who has a higher
valuation vi > vj and a higher budget realization wi > wj win? In the following, I show that
this weaker statement is also not true in general, but can hold under additional assumptions
on the budget distributions F1 and F2.
For example, let m1 = w. Then, by the weakly monotonic strategies in Theorem 3
bidders bid their entire budget bi(w) = w. If a bidder with the highest value has a strictly
higher budget than his opponent, he wins with probability one.
Next, let m1 < w and consider bidders with equal budget distribution F := F1 = F2 who
play the pure strategy weakly monotonic equilibrium with the bidding functions in Section
3.4. In Section 4.2, I established that a common budget distribution F and vi ≥ vj translates
21This requires a stronger version of RHR-dominance. See the proof in the appendix for further details.
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into i = 2 (i.e., v2 ≥ v1) and Case (C1). Proposition 2 establishes that b2(w) ≥ b1(w). Note
that in Case (C1) only bidder 1 can place a mass point, while bidder 2 follows a strictly
increasing pure strategy. Hence, for w2 > w1, it holds that b1(w1) ≤ b2(w1) < b2(w2): bidder
2 with the higher valuation wins the auction if he has a higher budget than his opponent.
The finding that the highest valuation bidder wins if he has a higher budget cannot be
extended for arbitrary distributions. For example, let v1 = 1.2, v2 = 1 and the budget
distributions stem from Example 1. A quick computation reveals that Case (C1) holds, as
m1 = 3/5, m2 = 2/3, U1(m1) = 9/25 and U2(m2) = 4/27. Then, bidder 1 with a budget in
[0.6,
√
0.4] bids at the mass point on 0.6 and loses against the lower value opponent who has a
budget above m1. Hence, although v1 > v2 and w1 > w2, bidder 1 loses with a probability of
one for all w1 ∈ (0.6,
√
0.4) if w2 > m1. The stronger bidder bids less aggressively and admits
a mass point. This is particularly inefficient if the stronger bidder has a lower valuation.
5 Extensions
5.1 Revenue Comparison
Revenue equivalence between standard auctions does not hold when bidders are budget
constrained, as noted by Che and Gale (1996, 1998, 2006).22 Consider a framework where
values are common knowledge and identical, i.e., v1 = v2, and budgets are drawn from an
identical distribution, F (w) := F1(w) = F2(w). Che and Gale (1996) proved that in this
framework, the FPA dominates the second-price auction (SPA) with regards to revenue.
I show that this revenue ranking does not hold under asymmetric budget distributions
F1 6= F2: the SPA can yield strictly higher revenue than the FPA for sufficiently asymmetric
bidders. First, consider bidding strategies in a SPA without reservation values.
Proposition 5. Let v := v1 = v2 be public information, and budgets distributions governed
by the distribution functions F1(w) and F2(w). In a SPA without a reservation price, it is a
weakly dominant strategy to bid bi(w) = min{v, w}, ∀i ∈ {1, 2},∀w ∈ [w,w].
Proof. Consider bidder i, who has a budget w and whose opponent bids some bj. Let v ≤ w.
Then, the classical argument of the SPA applies: bidding less (bi < v) potentially loses the
auction and forgoes a positive payoff, and changes nothing in case of a win. Bidding higher
(bi > v) only changes the outcome if it results in purchasing the object for more than v,
22These three papers show for different value-budget type spaces that the FPA dominates the SPA in
terms of expected revenue.
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and, thus, a negative payoff. Let w < v. Then, bidding higher than w is infeasible. The
only possible deviation is downward, bi < w. However, this is not profitable, because it only
changes the outcome if w > bj ≥ bi. In this case bidder i loses, while bidding bi = w would
have resulted in strictly positive payoff v − bj.
Whenever both bidders have a budget above v, the auctioneer gets a payment of the full
object value v. Whenever at least one bidder has a budget below the object value, the payoff
of the seller is the lowest of the two budgets.
Let x := min{v, w} be the highest possible bid under any budget realization. The bidding
strategies in Proposition 5 result in the following expected revenue for the designer in the








(1− F1(w))(1− F2(w))dw. (14)
Now, consider the revenue in a FPA. The bidders share the same valuation v, the auc-
tioneer’s valuation is zero, and the object is always sold. Hence, the auction outcome is
efficient and the total generated surplus is v. The revenue of the seller is the object value v
minus the expected utilities of the bidders. That is,







The next proposition shows that the revenue ranking ΠFPA ≥ ΠSPA of the symmetric
framework in Che and Gale (1996) does not extend to asymmetric budget distributions.
Proposition 6. Let v := v1 = v2, and budgets be drawn with log-concave distribution func-
tions F1(w) and F2(w). Then, the SPA can yield a strictly higher revenue than the FPA.
Proof. Let w ∈ [0, 1], F1(w) = w9, F2(w) = w 19 , and both bidders have valuation v = 0.2.
Then, m1 = 150 , and m2 =
9
50 . Plugging this into Equation 14 yields an expected revenue in
the SPA of
ΠSPA ≈ 0.05.
Next, consider the FPA. The ex-ante utilities of the bidders can be computed from the









(v − w)F1(w)f2(w)dw + (v −m1)F2(m1)(1− F2(m1)) ≈ 0.041
Plugging this into Equation 15 yield ΠFPA ≈ 0.042. Thus, unlike in the symmetric setup
with identical budget distributions, the SPA can yield a strictly higher revenue than the
FPA, ΠSPA > ΠFPA.
In the literature on standard auctions without budget constraints, asymmetrically dis-
tributed valuations break revenue equivalence between standard auctions (Maskin and Riley,
2000). A revenue ranking between standard auctions remains a subject of research, as no
general revenue ranking can be established. For some particular distributions, revenue in
a FPA is higher than in a SPA (see, e.g., Maskin and Riley, 2000). This ranking does not
always hold, as Gavious and Minchuk (2014) show that revenue in a SPA can be higher than
that in a FPA under asymmetry.
With asymmetric budget constraints and common valuations, I showed that the revenue
ranking ΠFPA ≥ ΠSPA no longer holds. It remains an open question as to under which
conditions the FPA yields a higher revenue than the SPA in a framework with asymmetric
budget constraints. Yet, finding a revenue ranking in this framework for particular asym-
metric budget constraints might turn out more practical than for asymmetric valuations, as
this paper provides a closed form expression for revenue and bidding behavior.
5.2 Information Disclosure
In the following, the auctioneer has the choice whether to disclose the identities of the
bidders, e.g., by publishing a participation register. For this section, I assume that both
bidders value the object equally, v := v1 = v2.
Giving up the anonymity of the bidders is a relevant strategic decision for the designer.
If the auctioneer discloses nothing, bidders are ex-ante symmetric in the sense that their
distribution is drawn from the same prior distribution. If the auctioneer publishes a public
participation register, bidders can look up annual budget reports and make inferences about
the budget distributions of the opponents. I show that with ex-ante symmetric bidders, the
auctioneer can never gain by disclosing noisy information about the budgets.
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Let S be the finite set of budget type distributions, with each s ∈ S corresponding to a
log-concave budget distribution function Fs(w) on equal support [w,w]. The term type in
this section refers to the type s of the budget distribution function, not the budget realization
w. The budget distribution types s1 and s2 of bidders 1 and 2 are drawn independently and
identically, with a probability ps > 0 for type s ∈ S, with ∑
s∈S
ps = 1. Let the expected
budget distribution F (w) := ∑
s∈S
psFs(w) also satisfy log-concavity.
Before the start of the auction, the auctioneer commits whether she wants to publish a
participation register. Then, bidders arrive and budget types Fi ∈ {Fs}s∈S are drawn for
i = {1, 2}. Bidders know their own type, but not the type of their opponent. The auctioneer
observes both types and publicly announces the types, if she committed to do so. Then,
budgets are drawn and observed only by the respective bidder. Finally, a FPA takes place.
Proposition 7. Revenue is weakly decreasing, if the auctioneer discloses budget-type infor-
mation about ex-ante symmetric bidders.
The total surplus generated by the auction equals v, and consists of the auctioneer’s
revenue and the bidders’ expected utilities. Hence, a higher expected utility for the bidders
corresponds to a lower payoff for the auctioneer. Under no disclosure (of budget types s1
and s2), the bidders have identical expectations about their opponent’s budget distribution.
In this symmetric case, the lower bound on the equilibrium utility binds for every budget
w.23 Under disclosure of budget types, the lower bound utility is weakly higher, as bidders
can condition their best response bid upon their opponent’s budget type. Furthermore, as I
showed in Theorem 1, under asymmetry, a bidder can achieve an equilibrium utility strictly
above his lower bound utility. Thus, under information disclosure, bidders are better off
than under no disclosure, which leaves a smaller share of the total surplus for the auctioneer.
In many auction houses, such as Sotheby’s, bidding is anonymous: bidders take part in an
auction, before knowing who their opponents will be. Moreover, during the auction, bidders
remain anonymous by placing bids via phone or by raising one’s auction paddle. For narrow
markets such as the telecommunications sector, while usually participants are announced
before the start of the auction, this in fact might not constitute a strategic decision of the
auction designer, but rather a peculiarity of the respective market: anonymity might not be
implementable in such a narrow market with few constantly interacting participants.
In this section, I analyzed a very specific information disclosure rule: the auctioneer has
the choice as to whether she wants bidders to remain symmetric, or reveal noisy information
23Che and Gale (1996) showed this for a symmetric monotonic equilibrium. In Corollary 2, I established
that the lower bound binds in any equilibrium.
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about the budget distributions. However, this noisy information is exogenously given and
the auctioneer cannot modify its precision or send private and potentially correlated signals.
Future research could endogenize the information structure further by allowing the auction-
eer to design the signal precision, as in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), in line with
the expanding literature on Bayesian persuasion (see, e.g., Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011).
Proposition 7 still holds, if the type space S is not given, but designed by the auctioneer.
However, any type in S has to satisfy log-concavity and have a strictly positive density on
the same support as all other types: [w,w]. Enabling the designer to create types with dif-
ferent support (e.g., by allowing a monotone partition24 into a low-budget and a high-budget
interval) might yield further insights about the optimal information disclosure policy.
5.3 All-Pay Auction
In this section, I apply my results to the all-pay auction. Similar to the FPA, the lower
bound of bidder i with budget w, who faces a naive j-opponent bidding his entire budget, is
Uai (w) := max0≤bi≤w
viFj(bi)− bi.
For the FPA, Assumption 1 is sufficient to guarantee that the lower bound utility U i is
strictly increasing in a bid below some mi > w, and constant thereafter. For the all-pay
auction, Assumption 1 is not sufficient to guarantee these properties of the lower bound
utility Uai . For example, with v ≤ 1 and F2(w) = w for w ∈ [0, 1], the lower bound utility of
bidder 1 is Ua1(w) = 0 for all w. To employ similar tools to the ones developed in previous
sections, I impose the following assumption.
Assumption 2. It holds that w = 0. For any i ∈ {1, 2}, viFj(b) − b has a unique global
maximum at mai > w, and is strictly increasing in b below mai .
For example, vi ≥ 1 and Fi(b) for i = 1, 2 strictly concave satisfies Assumption 2. The
following result sums up the equilibrium bid distribution in an all-pay auction.
Theorem 4. Let Assumption 2 hold. The all-pay auction has an equilibrium.





1)) +ma1 if Ua1(ma1)− Ua2(ma2) ≥ v1 − v2,
v2(1− F1(ma2)) +ma2 if Ua1(ma1)− Ua2(ma2) < v1 − v2.
(16)
24See, e.g., Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007) for disclosing information about valuations, not budgets,
in auctions, where monotone partitions arise as part of the optimal disclosure policy.
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In any equilibrium, equilibrium utilities are unique and the bid distributions satisfy
Ga1(b) =





if b ∈ [ma1, ba],
Ga2(b) =





if b ∈ [ma1,ma2),
v1−ba+b
v1
if b ∈ [ma2, ba].
(17)
Note that bidder 1 bids with a uniform distribution above ma1, and bidder 2 also bids
uniformly on (ma1,ma2) and (ma2, b
a]. To make the opponent indifferent between any bid
in some interval in an all-pay auction, uniform bidding is required.25 Similar to the FPA,
equilibrium utilities in the all-pay auction are unique in any equilibrium. They are given also
by Theorem 1, after substituting Uai for U i, and mai for mi. In the proof in the Appendix,
I construct weakly monotonic pure strategies in Equations 34 and 35 that establish the
existence of an equilibrium.
The uniqueness result of equilibrium utility and bid distributions in the all-pay auction
holds if the lower bound is strictly increasing for sufficiently low budget levels, and constant
thereafter. In the FPA, the log-concavity of the budget distributions is sufficient to guarantee
that the lower bound utility has these properties. In the all-pay auction, the log-concavity
of the budget distributions does not imply this shape of the lower bound, and imposing
Assumption 2 is with loss of generality.26
6 Concluding Remarks
In this work, I have derived equilibrium utilities and bid distributions for two bidders with
asymmetric budget distributions, who compete for one object in a FPA. I allow for any
asymmetry in the budget distributions, as long as they satisfy log-concavity and common
full support.
Che and Gale (1996) showed that in a symmetric equilibrium with identically distributed
budgets, the equilibrium utilities of the bidders equal a lower bound on utility. I have
25This has been noted in the context of all-pay auctions with complete information and no budget con-
straints. See, e.g., Amann and Leininger (1996); Baye et al. (1996).
26For arbitrary budget distributions F1 and F2, Uai can be zero for every budget level or have multiple
flat intervals. Hence, an equilibrium might involve multiple mass points where the lower bound alternates
between flat intervals and increasing intervals. While some results and methods from this paper are applicable
to such a scenario, a closed-form characterization and the uniqueness of an equilibrium utility remains an
open questions.
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extended the framework of Che and Gale (1996) in two directions: I allow for different
valuations for the object, and introduce asymmetric budget constraints. In this framework,
the lower bound does not necessarily bind. However, the equilibrium utilities in a FPA can
still be recovered from the lower bound. I also applied this technique to the all-pay auction
to derive the unique equilibrium shape and bid distributions.
My approach unravels the equilibrium via eliminating candidate equilibria shapes. As
long as both RHR are sufficiently high, equilibrium strategies are invariant to the degree
of asymmetry and the lower bounds bind. If a RHR drops below a threshold, mass points
can arise and bidders achieve a utility strictly above their lower bound. I show that there
remains only one potential shape for the equilibrium utility and bid distributions after this
elimination, and construct weakly monotonic bidding strategies to establish existence.
There exists a parallel between my framework and bidders with asymmetrically dis-
tributed valuations with no budget constraints. If bidders are asymmetric in the valuation
dimension and have no budget constraints, bidding behavior in a FPA beyond a differential
equation is complicated to derive without additional assumptions27 (see, e.g., Maskin and
Riley, 2000). If bidders have asymmetric budget distributions and common knowledge val-
uations, the auction game is solvable in closed-form under weak assumptions (log-concavity
and full common support) as my results show. I impose no stochastic order or particular
distribution on the budget distributions. Maskin and Riley (2000) show that a weaker bidder
bids more aggressively under the additional assumption of RHR-dominance on valuations
if there are no budget constraints. In my model, under RHR-dominance on budget distri-
butions, the weaker bidder with respect to the budget also bids more aggressively than his
stronger opponent.
Mass points can be part of an equilibrium because budget constraints are hard, and
bidders cannot outbid their budget. Due to the tie-breaking rule, bidding below a mass
point of the opponent yields a strictly lower utility than bidding exactly at a mass point.
Furthermore, bidding at a mass point of the opponent yields strictly lower utility than
bidding above a mass point. The incentives to increase one’s budget are particularly strong
around mass points. For example, if a bidder with a budget slightly below a mass point could
borrow to increase his budget, he could derive a discrete jump in surplus by bidding at the
mass point. This might influence the initial budget distribution if the budget is determined
endogenously before the start of the auction.28 Finding an equilibrium with asymmetric
27For example, RHR-dominance or uniform or power law value distributions.
28I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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budget distributions and allowing bidders to borrow (see, e.g., Zheng, 2001, for soft budgets
with a borrowing market) might be an interesting question for future research.
A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Letmi ∈ arg max(vi−b)Fj(b) be a best reply bid of an unconstrained
bidder who faces a naive opponent. A bid at or below the lowest budget w never wins and
yields utility zero. A bid b > w such that b < vi yields a strictly positive expected payoff.
Hence, mi > w.
The derivative of the expected payoff with respect to b is (vi − bi)fj(b) − Fj(b). This is





The RHR on the left-hand side is decreasing in b by Assumption 1; the right-hand side
is strictly increasing in b for b < vi. If there exists an mi such that fj(mi)Fj(mi) =
1
vi−mi , it is
unique. Then, for all w < mi, the RHR inequality is strict and the lower bound is strictly
increasing. For w > mi, the inequality does not hold and the lower bound is constant at
(vi −mi)Fj(mi). Any bid b > mi yields a strictly lower expected utility than bidding mi.
The above inequality might also hold strictly for all w. In this case, mi = w as the
opponent never bids above w. The lower bound strictly increases over the entire domain.
Proof of Lemma 2. By contradiction, let bidder i with a budget w˜ ∈ (w′, w′′) place a bid
b˜ < w˜ below his budget. The expected utility of budget level w˜ is then
Ui(w˜) = (vi − b˜) Pr(bj < b˜) + 12(vi − b˜) Pr(bj = b˜). (18)
Take a bidder i with a lower budget (w˜ − ) ∈ (w′, w′′) who can afford the bid b˜, i.e.,
choose  > 0 such that b˜ ≤ w˜ − . Such a bidder can mimic the w˜-budget type: bid b˜ and
obtain the same utility as in Equation 18. This contradicts Ui(w˜) > Ui(w˜− ) if Ui is strictly
increasing on (w′, w′′). Hence, bi(w) = w for w ∈ (w′, w′′).
A bidder i with a budget w ≤ w′ cannot afford a bid above w′; bidder i with a budget
above w′′ bids at least w′′ as any lower bid yields lower payoff as Ui is strictly increasing on
(w′, w′′). Hence, Gi(w) = Fi(w) for w ∈ (w′, w′′).
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Proof of Lemma 3. By contradiction, let Ui strictly increase on (w′, w′′) and there exists
a budget level w′ ∈ (w′, w′′) such that Ui(w′) > U i(w′) .
As Ui is strictly increasing, by Lemma 2 this implies that bidder i with budget realization
in (w′, w′′) bids his entire budget bi(w) = w and
Gi(w) = Fi(w) for all w ∈ (w′, w′′). (19)
Next, I show that the bidding distribution function Gj of bidder j does not place sufficient
probability on w′ to elevate bidder i’s utility strictly above the lower bound U i(w′).
Case 1: mj < w′′. A bid in b˜ in the interval (mj, w′′) yields utility (vj − b˜)Fi(b˜) to bidder
j, due to the observation in Equation 19. In this interval, it is equivalent to bidding against
a naive opponent. Bidding b˜ yields a utility strictly below the lower bound, as bidder j could
be strictly better off by bidding mj instead of b˜:
(vj − b˜)Fi(b˜) < (vj −mj)Fi(mj) = U j(w ≥ mj).
Hence, bidder j never bids within the interval (mj, w′′). However, in this case, Ui cannot
be strictly increasing on w ∈ (mj, w′′), leading to a contradiction.29
Case 2: mj ≥ w′′. The utility of bidder j is strictly increasing in a bid on this interval, as
it coincides with the lower bound U j(w) = (vj −w)Fi(w), which is strictly increasing below
mj. Hence, if bidding in this interval, bidder j would choose the highest feasible bid for him,
bj(w) = w.
Either bidder j with budget w ∈ (w′, w′′) bids bj(w) = w, or he places another feasible
bid b′ ≤ w′ if it yields a strictly higher utility than the lower bound utility at w. However,
if such a b′ exists, bidder j with a budget in (w′, w) never places a bid in this interval. This
contradicts that Ui is strictly increasing on (w′a, w). If such a b′ does not exist, it holds that
Gj(w) = Fj(w) for all w ∈ (w′, w′′). However, this is not sufficient to elevate the utility of
bidder i with budget w′ above the lower bound:
Ui(w′) = (vi − w′) Pr(bj < w′) + 12(vi − w
′) Pr(bj = w′)
= (vi − w′)Fj(w′) = U i(w′).
which yields a contradiction.
29Slightly decreasing bidder i’s bid yields the same positive winning probability for a lower payment.
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Proof of Lemma 4. First, I establish that for the lowest possible budget w it always
holds that the lower bound binds: U i(w) = Ui(w). Assume by contradiction that for some
i ∈ {1, 2}, it holds that U i(w) = 0 < Ui(w). Because bidder i with any budget realization
has a strictly positive utility,30 any bid wins with a strictly positive probability. Let a bid bi
be the infimum bid in the entire bidding support of the i-bidder with any budget realization.
Note that bi ≤ w. For bi to win with positive probability, this requires bidder j to (i) place a
mass point at bi, or (ii) bid with a strictly positive probability below bi. The latter scenario
(ii) is impossible in equilibrium, as it requires some bidder j with a budget above w to bid
below bi. Each such bid of j strictly below bi results in an expected utility of zero (it never
wins), which is below the lower bound U j and, thus, impossible. The former scenario (i) (a
mass point at bi) cannot be part of an equilibrium, because bidder i would always want to
slightly outbid the mass point if feasible to gain a discrete jump in winning probability. This
implies that Fi(bi) = Gi(bi) = 0. The positive mass of the j-bidders who bid at the mass
point derive zero utility, which is strictly below the lower bound U j for some of them. This
yields a contradiction, and hence, U i(w) = Ui(w) = 0.
Next, I prove the theorem by contradiction for w ∈ (w,m1). Assume Ui(w) > U i(w) for
some w ∈ (w,m1). Both U i(w) for i ∈ {1, 2} are strictly increasing on [w,m1). Let x > w
be the budget within (w,m1), for which the strictly monotonic lower bound U i(.) catches up
and reaches the same value, i.e., Ui(w) = U i(x). If such x does not exists, take m1. That
is, equilibrium utility is strictly above the lower bound Ui > U i, on at least the non-empty
interval [w, x).
As Ui is a monotonic function, it can have only countable jump discontinuities on (w, x).
Hence, Ui has to be either (i) continuous and strictly increasing, or (ii) constant on some
subinterval within [w, x). A strict increase in (i) is ruled out by Lemma 3: Ui cannot be
both strictly increasing and strictly above the lower bound U i. I show in the following that
the latter yields a contradiction as well, if both U i(w) are strictly increasing.
Let Ui(w) = U > U i(w) be constant on some intervals within (w, x). Define zi = inf{w :
Ui(w) = U} as the lowest budget, above which bidder i achieves a payoff equal to U . First,
let zi = w. This is ruled out by the first paragraph of this proof that established that
Ui(w) = U i(w) = 0.
Second, let zi > w. Ui is a monotonic function, and a continuous strict increase on an
open interval is ruled out by Lemma 3. Hence, bidder j has a mass point at zi, as by Lemma
3 any increase above the lower bound in the interior is due to a mass point. This implies that
30This is because Ui(w) ≥ Ui(w) > 0 for all w, where the second inequality is assumed by contradiction.
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zi is indeed the infimum, not the minimum. Bidder i-types with a budget above zi always
bid above zi to extract the additional winning probability from avoiding the tie-breaking
rule; therefore, Fi(zi) = Gi(zi). However, this yields a contradiction for the utility of bidder
j: a mass point of j at zi implies that there is a continuum of bidder j with a budget above
zi who can at most achieve (vj − zi)Fj(zi) = U j(zi); otherwise they would have a profitable
deviation by bidding above zi instead of sticking to the mass point. Bidding zi yields an
expected payoff of (vj − zi)Gi(zi) = (vj − zi)Fi(zi), which equals the lower bound U j(zi).
Yet, the lower bound is strictly increasing around zi: if bidder j-types had a constant utility
to establish the mass point for higher budget realizations than zi, their utility would fall
strictly below the lower bound on utility, which is impossible.
The previous argument established that Ui(w) = U i(w) below m1. The second part of
the Lemma follows from Lemma 3: as U i(w) is strictly increasing below m1, all bidders bid
their entire budget on (w,m1).
Proof of Lemma 5. First, I introduce two auxiliary results in Lemma A.1 and Lemma
A.2. Let bi be the supremum.
Lemma A.1. Let m1 < w. Then, the following holds in any equilibrium:
1. the supremum bids of the bidders coincide, b := b1 = b2,
2. there is no mass point at b,
3. m1 < b < min(v1, v2).
Proof. For the first statement of the lemma, assume by contradiction that b1 < b2. Any bid
of bidder 2, denoted b2, in the interval (b1, b2] wins with a probability of one and yields a
utility of (v2 − b2). For any bid in this open interval, there exists a profitable deviation to
shade the bid down by some  > 0 small enough such that b2 −  > b1. This deviation still
wins the auction with certainty, however, for a strictly lower payment.
Let by contradiction b ≥ min(v1, v2). If a bidder bids his full valuation vi or above, this
yields a utility of 0 or below. However, as vi > w, the lower bound utility of a bidder with
some budget w′ ≥ vi is strictly positive, which yields a contradiction. Hence, b < min(v1, v2).
Next, consider the second statement of the lemma. A mass point at b = w is infeasible,
as only bidders with budget realization w (which is a zero probability event) can afford the
highest bid. Now, assume b < w. Let bidder i have a mass point at b < min(v1, v2). Then,
bidder j with a budget above b has a profitable deviation: slightly outbidding his supremum
bid b. Bidding b +  for some  > 0 sufficiently small yields a jump in winning probability,
by avoiding the tie-breaking at b for an infinitesimally lower payment.
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Finally, I show that b > m1. By Lemma 4, it holds that b ≥ m1 and Fi(w) = Gi(w)
for w < m1. Let by contradiction b = m1. Since m1 < w holds by assumption, there is a
positive mass of bidders with budget in [m1, w] who bid at m1. This contradicts that there
is no mass point at b.
The next result shows that every non-empty open interval within [m1, b] contains strictly
positive bidding probability mass.
Lemma A.2. For any pair x, y ∈ [m1, b] with x < y, it holds that Gi(x) < Gi(y) for any i.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exist x < y in [m1, b], such that G′i := Gi(x) =
Gi(y).31 Let α := inf{w : Gi(w) = G′i} and β := sup{w : Gi(w) = G′i}. By Lemma 4,
α ≥ m1, and β < b.
Opponent j 6= i also places zero bidding mass on (α, β), as lowering j’s bid in this range
yields a strictly lower payment for the same winning probability. Let G′j := Gj(b ∈ (α, β)).
There cannot be a mass point at β. If both bidders place a mass point at β, both have
a strictly profitable deviation to slightly outbid the mass point. If only one bidder places a
mass point at β, he has a strictly profitable deviation to decrease his bid; without an atom
of his opponent at β, a decrease in the bid slightly below β implies a strictly lower payment
for the same winning probability. Hence, Pr(bi = β) = Pr(bj = β) = 0. Furthermore, by the
properties of a cumulative distribution function, it holds that limb↘β Pr(bj = b) = 0.
Bidder i’s payoff of bidding b ↘ β is limb↘β
[
(vi − b) Pr(bj < b) + 12(vi − b) Pr(bj = b)
]
= (vi − β)G′j. A bid of α yields (vi − α)G′j (if there is no mass point at a), which is strictly
higher. Hence, a positive bidder mass bidding sufficiently close to β could do strictly better
by shading their bid to α, and pay strictly less for a negligible loss in winning probability.
As a downward deviation is feasible with budget constraints, this is a contradiction.
Assume by contradiction that there exist w′ and w′′ with w′ < w′′ such that Ui(w′) <
Ui(w′′) in one of the three intervals in Statement 2 in Lemma 5. Ui is a monotonic function.
It is only possible to have Ui(w′) < Ui(w′′) if at least one of the following statements hold:
(a) Ui increases continuously and strictly on some open interval in [w′, w′′].
(b) Ui has a jump discontinuity in [w′, w′′].32
31As Gi is a cumulative distribution function, Gi(x) > Gi(y) is impossible.
32All discontinuities of Ui are jump discontinuities, as Ui is monotonic.
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First, I show that (a) cannot hold in any equilibrium. Let Ui be strictly and continuously
increasing on some (a, b) ⊆ (w′, w′′).
Let i = 1. By Lemma 2, U1 = U1 on (a, b). However, U1 is constant above m1,
which yields a contradiction. Next, let i = 2. If (w′, w′′) ⊂ (m2, w], the same argument
applies: U2 = U2 on (a, b). However, U2 is constant above m2, yielding a contradiction. If
(w′, w′′) ⊂ (m1,m2), by Lemma 2, bidder 2 bids with G2 = F2 on (a, b). This implies that
bidder 1 would not want to place any bid in the interval (a, b): a bid x would yield utility
(v1 − x)F2(x), which is strictly smaller than the surplus from bidding m1 < a, which is at
least equal to (v1−m1)F2(m1). As bidder 1 never places a bid in (a, b), bidder 2 (who places
a bid in this interval) has a strictly profitable deviation: decrease one’s bid, win with the
same (strictly positive) winning probability, but pay less in case of a win.
Second, I show that (b) is also not possible in equilibrium. Let the jump discontinuity
occur at x ∈ [w′, w′′]. A jump discontinuity in Ui at x can only occur if Gj contains an atom
at which a bidder i with budget x is bidding.33 This follows from Lemma A.2, as without
atoms the payoff of a bid b ∈ [w, b] is (vi−b)Gj(b) (and also the maximum of this in Equation
18), which is a continuous function.
Then, a bid slightly above the atom yields a strictly higher utility to bidder i than
bidding at the mass point. This is because by infinitesimally outbidding the mass point,
bidder i gets a discrete jump in winning probability for a marginally higher payment, and
the mass point lies strictly below min{v1, v2} by Lemma A.1. Any bidder i with a budget
strictly above x would not bid at the mass point, but slightly above x or even higher.
Therefore, Fi(x) = Gi(x). However, bidder j then placing the mass point at x has a strictly
profitable deviation: bidding mj instead of the mass point and getting a payoff of at least
(vj − mj)Fi(mi). This is strictly larger than the payoff from bidding at the mass point,
(vj − x)Fi(x) for x > mj.
As (a) or (b) lead to a contradiction, this establishes Statement 2 of the lemma. Further-
more, from the last paragraph, any discontinuity of Ui at x > mj yields a strictly profitable
deviation for bidder j. Any discontinuity of Ui below mj is ruled out by Lemma 4. This
leaves one potential discontinuity at mj, proving Statement 1 of the lemma.
A discontinuity in Uj at mi is due to a mass point of bidder i at mi, due to Lemma A.2.
If bidder i places an atom at mi, bidder j’s utility has a jump discontinuity at mi: bidder j
has a strictly higher surplus from bidding slightly above the mass point than his surplus from
33If the mass point were below, bidder i with a lower budget could afford it and obtain the same utility
as budget type x, which contradicts the existence of a jump discontinuity in Ui at budget realization x.
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bidding exactly at the mass point, because he can avoid the tie-breaking rule. Therefore,
bidder j prefers to bid above mi whenever he can afford it, and Fj(mi) = Gj(mi). Hence,
bidder i’s utility from bidding at the atom is Ui(mi) = (vi −mi)Gj(mi) = U i(mi).
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let m1 = w, and, thus, m2 = w. Then, Lemma 4 pins down
the utilities for w < w and the supremum bid b = w. As by Lemma A.1 there is no mass
point at b, it also holds that Ui(w) = U i(w) = (vi − b).
Next, assume m1 < w and let (m1,m2) be non-empty. Then, the equilibrium utility
of bidder 2 is discontinuous at m1 and requires a mass point of bidder 1. This is because
by Lemma 5, U2(w) is constant for budget realizations w ∈ (m1, w]. Note that U2(w) ≥
U2(m2) for w ∈ (m1, w], with U2(m2) being the highest value for the lower bound, which
the equilibrium utility cannot undercut. Moreover, U2(m2) > U2(m1) strictly, as the lower
bound is strictly increasing below m2 due to the log-concavity assumption. By Theorem 4,
the lower bound binds, U2(w) = U2(w) for w ∈ [w,m1). Approaching the utility of bidder
2 from both sides at m1 shows the discontinuity and, therefore, a mass point of bidder 1:
limw↗m1 U2(w) = U2(m1) < U2(m2) ≤ limw↘m1 U2(w). Bidder 1 has to have a mass point
at m1 in his bid distribution function to enable this jump in the expected utility of bidder 2
to achieve a utility of at least the lower bound.
When does bidder 2 place a mass point at m2? Both bidders share the same supremum
bid. The payoff from bidding b is vi − b, as it wins with a probability of one, as there is no
mass point at it.34 As the payoff is non-decreasing in the bid, the highest budget type w has
the same utility as bidding at the supremum. Hence, the difference in surplus of the highest
budget types always satisfies
U1(w)− U2(w) = v1 − v2.
If bidder 2 does not place a mass point, bidder 1’s utility is constant at U1(w) = U1(m1)
by Lemma 5. Furthermore, by Lemma 5, U1 is constant on (m1,m2) and (m2, w]. It is equal
to the lower bound on (m1,m2) as bidder 1 places a mass point at m1. Thus, unless there is
a jump discontinuity at m2, bidder 1’s utility is equal to his lower bound for all w.
Let (C1) holds, i.e., U1(m1)− U2(m2) ≥ v1 − v2. If bidder 2 were to place a mass point,
it would hold that U1(w) > U1(m1) and U2(w) = U2(m2). However, then U1(w)− U2(w) =
v1 − v2 > U1(m1)− U2(m2), which is a contradiction.
34If no bidder bids at the supremum, approaching the supremum bid in a small enough neighbourhood
yields the same argument.
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As bidder 2 does not place a mass point, it holds that U1(w) = U1(m1) and U2 =: U2(w >
m1) being constant. Thus,
U1(w)− U2(w) = U1(m1)− U2 = v1 − v2.
This pins down the utility level for bidder 2 with a budget above m1. Due to the equal
tie-breaking rule, bidder 2’s utility at m2 is exactly the average of the left and right hand
side limit of the utility. We have U1(w) = U1(w) for all w, and the expression for U2 in the
theorem follows.
Let (C2) holds, i.e., U1(m1)−U2(m2) < v1− v2. If bidder 2 does not place a mass point,
it holds that U1(w) = U1(m1) and U2(w) ≥ U2(m2). In this case, U1(w)−U2(w) = v1−v2 ≤
U1(m1)−U2(m2), yielding again a contradiction. Hence, bidder 2 places a mass point at m2.
Note that U2 is constant on (m1,m2) and U2(m2) = U2(m2). Furthermore, U2(w) = U2(m2)
and the constant utility of bidder 1 has to satisfy U1(w)−U2(m2) = v1−v2. This pins down
a unique equilibrium utility U1 and U2.
Finally, consider m1 = m2 < w. By Footnote 8, bidders are labeled such that U1(m1)−
U2(m2) ≥ v1− v2. Let U1(m1)−U2(m2) > v1− v2. Then, by the same arguments as above,
bidder 1 places a mass point at m1 which leads to a jump discontinuity in U2 at m1. This
pins down the utility of bidder 1 to U2 = U2 for all w ≥ m1, and raises the equilibrium
utility of bidder 2 via a jump discontinuity to the required level such that U2(w > m2) =
U1(m1)− (v1− v2). Let U1(m1)−U2(m2) = v1− v2. Then, no mass point can be sustained,
as it would distort utilities away from their final levels.
Plugging in the expression for the lower bounds completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma A.1, there is no mass point at the highest bid. For
simplicity, let b also be the maximum bid.35 A bid at the maximum b yields payoff vi − b,
as it wins with certainty. As surplus has to be weakly increasing in the bid, the payoff
from the highest bid corresponds to the payoff of the highest budget type, Ui(w). In Case
(C1), U1(w) = U1(m1) = (v1 − m1)F2(m1) = v1 − b. In Case (C2), U2(w) = U2(m2) =
(v2−m2)F1(m2) = v2− b. Solving for b in both cases yields the expression for the supremum
bid in the theorem.
Next, I derive the bid distributions G1 and G2. Let m1 = w. Then, the bid distributions
35If not, a similar argument holds by approaching the supremum bid from below, such that the probability
of a win converges to one. For clarity of the exposition, I omit this case.
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in the theorem follow from Lemma 4. For the following, assume that m1 < w. Below m1, bid
distributions coincide with the budget distributions Gi = Fi, by Lemma 4. By Lemma A.2
and 5, the bidding support coincides for both bidders and has no empty intervals in (w, b).
The following identifies where mass points can occur.
Let bidder j place a mass point at x ∈ (m1, b). By Lemma A.2 there is a continuum of
bidder i bidding in the left- or right-neighborhood of x. Due to a discrete jump in winning
probability at and above x, these bidders i bidding below the mass point have a strictly
lower utility than at the mass point, which in turn enjoy a lower utility than those bidding
slightly above the mass point. To rule out profitable deviations, this is only possible if
Ui(w < x) < Ui(x) < Ui(w > x), as bidder i with a budget of exactly (above) x would not
want to bid below (at) x.
Case (C1): Bidder 2 does not place any mass point, as U1(w ≥ m1) = U1(m1). Without
mass points of the opponent and with full bidding support below b (by Lemma A.2), the
following needs to be satisfied. For all b ∈ [m1, b], it holds that
(v1 − b)G2(b) = (v1 −m1)F2(m1).
Solving for G2(b) yields the bid distribution G2 above m1 in Theorem 2 that has to be
satisfied in any equilibrium.36
Similarly, bidder 1 cannot place a mass point above m1, as this would contradict that U2
is constant above m1 (which is required by Theorem 1). Any bid on (m1, b) yields the same
utility
(v2 − b)G1(b) = (v1 −m1)F2(m1)− (v1 − v2).
Solving for G1(b) yields the result for Case (C1).
Case (C2): Bidder 1 has no mass point above m1, as this would contradict U2(w >
m1) = U2(m2). Solving the following expression for G1 yields the result for bidder 1:
(v2 − b)G1(b) = (v2 −m2)F1(m2).
By the same argument, due to the constancy of the equilibrium utility U1, bidder 2
cannot place a mass point on [m1,m2) and (m2, b]. Bidder 1, with a budget strictly below
m2, bids with full support in [m1,m2), and the bid distribution of their opponent yields the
36The bid distributions below m1 are given by Lemma 4.
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indifference condition for these bids
(v1 − b)G2(b) = (v1 −m1)F2(m1).
Bidder 1, with a budget abovem2, bids abovem2, and their indifference condition satisfies
(v1 − b)G2(b) = (v2 −m2)F1(m2) + (v1 − v2).
Solving both indifference conditions for G2(b) yields the bid distribution in Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is by construction. If (C1) holds, let the bidding func-
tions be as in Equations 12 and 13. If (C2) holds, let the bidding functions of bidder 1 be
Equation 12 and the bidding function of bidder 2 be
b2(w) =

w if w ∈ [w,m1),
v1 − (v1−m1)F2(m1)F2(w) if w ∈ [m1, F−12 (
(v1−m1)F2(m1)
v1−m2 )),
m2 if w ∈ [F−12 ( (v1−m1)F2(m1)v1−m2 ), F−12 ( v1−bv1−m2 )],
v1 − v1−bF2(w) otherwise.
(20)
First, I show that these bidding functions aggregate into the bid distributions {Gi}i=1,2
in Theorem 2. For w < m1, bi(w) = w and hence Gi(b) = Fi(b) is satisfied. Let w ≥ m1. For
a bid in [m1, b], let wi(b) = sup{w : bi(w) = b} be the highest budget realization of a bidder
i who bids b. Note that Fi(wi(b)) = Gi(b). Consider bidder 2 in Equation 13 for (C1) with
a budget w ≥ m1. His bidding function b2(w) can be rewritten using the inverse bidding
function w2(b): b = v1 − v1−bG2(b) . Solving this expression for G2(b) yields the bid distribution
in Theorem 2. The same approach applied to bidder 1 in Equation 12 and to bidder 2 in
Equation 20 for (C2) yields the required bid distributions.
Next, I show the feasibility of the bidding functions, i.e., for all w and i it holds that
bi(w) ≤ w. For any bid equal to or below m1, feasibility is trivially satisfied. It is left to
show that 1. v1 − (v1−m1)F2(m1)F2(w) ≤ w; 2. vi − vi−bFj(w) ≤ w; 3. F−12 (
(v1−m1)F2(m1)
v1−m2 ) ≥ m2. Rewrite
Inequality 1 as (v1 − w)F2(w) ≤ (v1 − m1)F2(m1), which holds by Lemma 1. Rewrite
Inequality 2 as (vi − w)Fj(w) ≤ vi − b. This is true since for w ≥ mi, it holds that
(vi − w)Fj(w) ≤ U i(w) ≤ Ui(w) = vi − b. For Inequality 3, applying F2 to both sides yields
(v1−m1)F2(m1) ≥ (v1−m2)F2(m2). This holds by Lemma 1, hence, establishing feasibility.
Finally, I show optimality. Let w < m1. Any bid b < w yields strictly lower utility than
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bi(w) = w.37 Any higher bid b > w is unfeasible. Hence, a bidder with a budget w < m1
has no strictly profitable deviation. Let w ≥ m1 and (C1) hold. Any bid of bidder 1 in the
interval [m1, b] yields constant utility to bidder 1. It is straightforward to show that any
bid above b or below m1 yields a strictly lower utility, and there is no profitable deviation.
Bidder 2 with budget m1 has a higher utility from bidding exactly at m1 due to a mass point
of bidder 1 than from any lower bid, and cannot afford bidding higher than m1. Bidder
2 with budget w > m1 is indifferent between any bid on (m1, b], and strictly loses from
any deviation outside of this interval. Optimality in (C2) can be establishes by the same
technique.
Proof of Proposition 3. Proof of 2.⇒ 1. For w < m1, by Lemma 3, it holds that Ui(w) =
U i(w) ≥ U j(w) = Uj(w). For w ≥ m1 the following case distinction establishes the result,
utilizing the equilibrium utility in Corollary 1.
Let Case (C1) in Corollary 1 hold. If U1(w) ≥ U2(w), and v1 ≥ v2, then
U2(w ≤ w) ≤ U2(w) = (v2 − v1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+(v1 −m1)F2(m1) (21)
≤ (v1 −m1)F2(m1) = U1(m1) ≤ U1(w ≥ m1). (22)
If U2(w) ≥ U1(w) and v2 ≥ v1 in Case (C1), then
U1(w ≤ w) ≤ U1(w = w) = (v1 −m1)F2(m1) (23)
≤ 12
(v1 −m1)F2(m1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
U1(m1)
+ (v2 −m1)F1(m1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
U2(m1)
+ v2 − v1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
 (24)
= U2(m1) ≤ U2(w ≥ m1). (25)
Next, consider Case (C2).
Let U1(w) ≥ U2(w), and v1 ≥ v2. Note that (v1 −m1)F2(m1) = U1(m1) = U2(m2), and
U2(w) = (v2 −m2)F1(m2) = U2(m2). Hence,
U1(w ≥ m1) ≥ U1(m1) = (v1 − v2) + U1(m2) ≥ U2(m2) = U2(w) ≥ U2(w ≤ w). (26)
37This is because for w < m1, Gi = Fi and (vi − w)Fj(w) increases in w by Lemma 1.
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Finally, let U2(w) ≥ U1(w), and v2 ≥ v1. For w > m1, it holds that
U2(w > m1) = (v2 −m2)F1(m2) ≥ (v2 −m2)F1(m2) + (v1 − v2) = U1(w) ≥ U1(w ≤ w).
At m1, it holds that U1(m1) = U1(m1) ≤ U2(m1) ≤ U2(m1), which establishes 2.⇒ 1.
Proof of 1.⇒ 2.
First, I show that vi ≥ vj is a necessary condition for Ui ≥ Uj at every budget level. Let by
contradiction vi < vj and Ui ≥ Uj for all w. The supremum bid b corresponds to the highest
utility level and wins with probability one. As vi < vj, Ui(w) = vi − b < vj − b = Uj(w)
which contradicts Ui ≥ Uj.
It is left to show that Ui ≥ Uj implies U i ≥ U j at every w.
Assume by contradiction that there exists a w˜ such that U i(w˜) ≥ U j(w˜), and for all w,
it holds that Ui ≥ Uj. If w˜ < m1, there is an immediate contradiction by Lemma 3, as
the lower bound and the equilibrium utility coincide. Hence, it holds that U i ≥ U j for all
w < m1.
Next, consider w˜ ≥ m1. First, let i = 2 such that for all w, U2 ≥ U1. U1 is constant
above m1, and hence U1(m1) = U1(w˜). As established above, U2(w) ≥ U1(w) for w < m1.
By continuity of U i and U j, it also holds that U2(m1) ≥ U1(m1). Then, it has to hold that
∀w ≥ m1, U2(w) ≥ U2(m1) ≥ U1(m1) = U1(w).
Therefore, a budget level of w˜ such that U2(w˜) < U1(w˜) cannot exist by the properties
of the lower bound, yielding the contradiction.
Second, let i = 1 such that for all w, U1 ≥ U2. Let there exist a w˜ ≥ m1 such that
U1(w˜) < U2(w˜). Then, it holds that U1(m1) = U1(w˜) and U2(m2) ≥ U2(w˜). Furthermore,
as established above, v1 ≥ v2. Thus, Case (C2) in Corollary 1 holds. In this case, take any
w′ ∈ (m1,m2)38. By Corollary 1, this yields a contradiction to U1 ≥ U2:
U1(w) = U1(m1) = U1(w˜) < U2(w˜) ≤ U2(m2) = U2(w). (27)
Proof of Proposition 4. Let k = 2, that is, F ′2 ≥RHR F2. The proof for k = 1 with
F ′1 ≥RHR F1 works accordingly and is therefore omitted.
38Note that the interval (m1,m2) is nonempty if such a w˜ exists and it holds that U1 ≥ U2 for w > m1
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For bidder 2, m2 and U2 are not affected by his own budget distribution. For bidder 1,
let m1 = arg max{(v1 − b)F2(b)} and m′1 = arg max{(v1 − b)F ′2(b)}. Note that due to RHR-
dominance, it holds that m1 ≤ m′1. Furthermore, due to FOSD it holds that U1(w) ≥ U ′1(w)
for all w, and as the lower bound is non-decreasing it also holds that U1(m1) ≥ U ′1(m′1).
If m′1 > m2, the labels of the bidders as bidder 1 and 2 are reversed with F2 versus F ′2.39
Let i ∈ {1, 2} refer to the bidder identities with F2, and i˜ ∈ {1˜, 2˜} with F ′2.
Proof of b′ ≥ b: First, let the identities of the bidders be identical with both budget
distributions, i.e., i = i˜. Then, there are three possibilities: 1. (C1) holds with both budget
distributions, 2. (C2) holds with both budget distributions, 3. (C1) holds under F2 and (C2)
holds under F ′2.40 Consider the equation for b and b
′ in Theorem 2. If 1., b′ ≥ b by FOSD
and m′1 ≥ m1. If 2., b′ = b. If 3., it holds that b′ − b = U1(m1) − U2(m2) − (v1 − v2) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from (C1) under F2.
Second, let the identities of the bidders change (that is, such that 1˜ = 2 and 2˜ = 1)
because m1 ≤ m2 < m′1. If with both budget distributions (C1) applies, then v2 = v1˜ and
F1 = F2˜ and hence, b
′−b = v1−(v1−m1)F2(m1)−v2−(v2−m2)F1(m2) ≥ 0. If (C2) holds in
both cases, it holds that b′−b = v1−v2−[U ′1(m′1)− U2(m2)] ≥ v1−v2−[U1(m1)− U2(m2)] ≥
0. If (C1) holds with F2, and (C2) holds with F ′241, then b
′−b = v1−U ′1(m1)−v1+U1(m1) ≥ 0.
Proof of Gi being FOSD over Gi: First, let the labels of the bidders be the same with
both distributions, 1˜ = 1 and 2˜ = 2.
The bid distribution of bidder 1 with F2 is in Equation 11 in Theorem 4. With F ′2, it
becomes G′1(b) =




v2−b if b ∈ [m′1, b
′].
Below m1, G′1 = G1. and above m′1, it is immediate
that G′1 ≤ G1 as b′ ≥ b. For b ∈ [m1,m′1), it holds that v2 − b = U2(w) ≥ U2(m1) ≥
(v2 − b)F1(b). Thus, v2−bv2−b ≥ F1(b) and hence, G′1 ≤ G1 for all b.
The bid distribution of bidder 2 with F ′2 is again in Equation 11 in Theorem 4. Sub-
stituting F ′2 for F2, m′1 for m1, and b
′ for b, yields the new bid distribution under F ′2. As
before, it is apparent that G′2 ≤ G2 for bids below m1 or above m2. For b ∈ [m1,m′1) and
b ∈ [m′1,m2), the following inequality establishes that G′2 ≤ G2,
(v1 −m1)F2(m1) ≥ (v1 −m′1)F ′2(m′1) ≥ (v1 − b)F ′2(b).
Finally, let the labels of the bidders change such that 1˜ = 2 and 2˜ = 1. Consider bidder
39See the normalization in Section 3.1.
40It cant be the other way as U1(m1) ≥ U1(m′1).
41Note that it is impossible to have (C2) with F2 and (C1) with F ′2.
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1. His bid distribution with F2 and F ′2 can be recovered from Equation 11. With F ′2, his bid
distribution is
G2˜(b) = G′1(b) =










v2−b if b ∈ [m2˜, b
′] = [m′1, b
′].
(28)
Below m1 and above m′1, it immediately holds that G′1 ≤ G1 using b′ ≥ b. For b ∈
[m1,m′1), it holds that v2 − b = U2(w) ≥ (v2 −m2)F1(m2) ≥ (v2 − b)F1(b). This establishes
the inequality for the entire interval, and G′1 ≤ G1. For bidder 2, the same approach
establishes that G′2 ≤ G2 when identities change.
Note that the utility at every budget level is also lower with F ′2 than with F2. Without
loss, consider the utility of bidder 1 with budget w in Equation 18. The opponent bids either
with G′2 or G2. That is, any bid yields a weakly lower winning probability with G′2 than
with G2, while the surplus of a win (v1 − b) remains the same.
Both bidders strictly worse off: I show by example that both bidders can be strictly
worse off under F ′2 than under F2. Let v1 = v2 = 1, and the budget distribution functions
for w ∈ [0, 1] be F1(w) = w2, F2(w) = w, and F2(w) = w2. Then, it holds that m2 = m′1 = 23
and m1 = 12 . The equilibrium utilities at every budget realization of both bidders can be
computed using Equations 12 and 13 for (C1). The ex-ante expected utilities are



































2 ≈ 0.15. (31)
Proof of Proposition 7. Let s1 ∈ S and s2 ∈ S be the budget type realization of bidders
1 and 2.
First, consider the disclosure regime in which both budget distributions s1 and s2 are
public. Let UDi (w; si, sj) be bidder i’s equilibrium utility with budget w if the two budget
types are si and sj. Equilibrium utility is above the lower bound utility in which the opponent
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always bids his entire budget,
UDi (w; si, sj) ≥ UDi (w; si, sj) := max
b≤w
(v − b)Fsj(b).
Second, consider the no-disclosure regime in which both budget distributions s1 and s2
are private information. Let UNDi (w; si) be bidder i’s lower bound utility with budget w who
knows only his own budget type si, where his opponent with unknown budget type always
bids his entire budget,
UNDi (w; si) = max
b≤w
(v − b)F (b),
where the expected budget distribution of the opponent is F (b) = ∑
sj∈S
psjFsj(b). Note that
the lower bound at a budget w does not depend on a bidder’s own budget type si. This is
because his own budget distribution Fsi has no impact on his best response bids given w
and the bidding behavior of the opponent, as he bids after learning w.42
Both bidders share the same lower bound utility for any fixed budget realization w,
irrespective of the own budget type, UNDi (w; si) = UNDj (w; sj) for any si, sj ∈ S. Thus, the
analysis of the symmetric framework in Corollary 2 in Section 4.1 applies. In any equilibrium,
the lower bound and equilibrium utility at all w coincide in the no-disclosure regime,
UNDi (w; si) = UNDi (w; si), for all w, i, si.
Finally, I establish that at every w for any budget type si, equilibrium utility in the
no-disclosure regime is weakly lower than in the disclosure regime.
UNDi (w; si) = UNDi (w; si) = max
b≤w


















i (w; si, sj).
The revenue of the designer is the total surplus generated, v, minus the expected utilities
of both bidders (see Equation 15). Taking expectations over bidder i’s budget types si and
42The knowledge of one’s own budget type si has no impact on the best response bids, given one’s own
budget realization w and the bidding behavior of his opponent j.
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budget realizations w, the ex-ante expected utility of a bidder under no disclosure is lower
than under the disclosure regime. Hence, a lower expected utility for the bidders in the
no-disclosure regime corresponds to a higher revenue for the seller.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is analogous to the steps for the FPA. Let ba be the
supremum bid in the all-pay auction, and define the two cases as for the FPA:
(C1) if Ua1(m1)− Ua2(m2) ≥ v1 − v2,
(C2) if Ua1(m1)− Ua2(m2) < v1 − v2.
Under Assumption 2, the four core Lemmas 2, 3, 4 and 5 also hold for the all-pay auction,
after substituting Uai for U i, mai for mi, and b
a for b. The two auxiliary Lemmas A.1 and
A.2 in the Appendix, and Theorem 1 also hold after substituting the notation. This can
be checked using exactly the same steps of the proofs as for the FPA (therefore, I omit the
proofs). The only difference is to use Uai instead of U i, and to apply the payment rule of the
all-pay auction (always forgo one’s bid) instead of that for the FPA (pay only if win). Hereby,
the assumption w = 0 guarantees that the utility of bidding the lowest budget w = 0 is zero.
As Theorem 1 holds for the all-pay auction, equilibrium utilities are uniquely determined.
Supremum bids: Next, I derive the supremum bids of the bidders. As Lemma A.1 also
holds for the all-pay auction, there is no mass point at ba. Thus, bidding at the supremum
yields the highest possible utility vi − ba. Furthermore, as Theorem 1 also holds for the
all-pay auction, it holds that
Ua1 (w) = Ua1(ma1) = v1F2(ma1)−ma1 = v1 − ba if (C1),
Ua2 (w) = Ua2(ma2) = v2F1(ma2)−ma2 = v2 − ba if (C2).
Solving both equations for ba yields the supremum bids in the theorem.
Unique bid distributions: As Lemma 4 also holds for the all-pay auction, it holds that
Gai (b) = Fi(b) for b < ma1. In the following, consider bids b ≥ ma1. Any mass point of bidder
j at x ∈ [ma1, ba] leads to Uai (w < x) < Uai (x) < Uai (w > x). This holds as the bidding
support has no holes due to Lemma A.2 for the all-pay auction, and bidders profit from the
tie-breaking rule if they can afford it. Due to the constancy of utility in Lemma 5, bidder 1
can only have a mass point at ma1, and bidder 2 at ma1 or ma2.
First, let (C1) hold. By Theorem 1, Ua1 (w ≥ ma1) = Ua1(w). Any mass point of bidder
2 would elevate the utility of bidder 1 strictly above the required level, and is therefore
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impossible. For any bid above ma1 to yield a constant utility, the following inequality has to
be satisfied for b ∈ [ma1, ba],
v1G
a
2(b)− b = v1F2(ma1)−ma1.
Solving this for Ga2(b) yields the bid distribution in the theorem. Similarly, the constancy
of the utility of bidder 2 at Ua2 (w > ma1) = Ua1(ma1)− (v1 − v2) requires that
v2G
a
1(b)− b = v1F2(ma1)−ma1 − (v1 − v2).
Solving this for Ga1 yields the bid distribution in the theorem.




1(b)− b = v2F1(ma2)−ma2.
Solving this for Ga1(b) yields the result for bidder 1.
Bidder 1’s utility is constant on Ua1 (w) = Ua1(ma1) for w ∈ [ma1,ma2), and Ua1 (w) =
Ua2(ma2) + (v1 − v2) for w ∈ (ma2, ba]. Therefore,
v1G
a
2(b)− b = v1F2(ma1)−ma1 for w ∈ [ma1,ma2), (32)
v1G
a
2(b)− b = v2F1(ma2)−ma2 + (v1 − v2) for w ∈ (ma2, ba]. (33)
Solving for Ga2 yields the bid distribution in the theorem.
The remaining bid distributions Ga1 and Ga2 at ma1 and ma2 can be computed by taking
the right-sided limit of Gai at ma1 and ma2 (as a cumulative distribution function is right-
continuous).
Equilibrium existence follows via the following weakly monotonic pure strategies,
ba1(w) =

w if w ∈ [0,ma1),










w if w ∈ [0,ma1),


















a − v1(1− F2(w)) otherwise.
(35)
As in the proof for the FPA, it can be easily checked that these bidding functions satisfy
the bid distributions in Theorem 4, and lead to the equilibrium utilities in Theorem 1 for
the all-pay auction.
Optimality is satisfied: bidders with budget strictly below ma1 (and bidder 2 with budget
ma1) prefer to bid higher, but cannot afford it. If (C1) holds, all the remaining budget types
have no strictly profitable deviation, as any bid yields the same or lower utility. If (C2)
holds, all the remaining bidder 2 have the same equilibrium utility and can only do worse
by bidding differently. The remaining bidder 1 types have no profitable deviation: note
that ba1(m2) = m2. Thus, bidders with a budget below or at m2 cannot afford the strictly
profitable deviation to bid above m2, while bidders with a budget above m2 achieve the
highest possible utility with bids above m2 and have no strictly profitable deviation.




). For higher budgets,
w − ba1(w) = w −
(
b
a − v2(1− F1(w))
)
= (v2 − ba)− (v2F1(w)− w) ≥ Ua2 (w)− Ua2(w) ≥ 0.




also holds for the remaining budget realizations, as
w − (v1 [F2(w)− F2(ma1)] +ma1) = (v1F2(ma1)−ma1)− (v1F2(w)− w) ≥ 0, (36)
where the last inequality holds by Assumption 2.
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